Objective: This study examines the effect of inter-industry bankruptcy contagion on earnings informativeness of surviving firms between 2011 – 2015. Methods: In this regard, we test the informativeness of 123 companies listed in the Tehran stock Exchange among 19 industries by abnormal return – unexpected earning regression. Results: Statistical results demonstrate that a firm probability of bankruptcy is negatively associated with informativeness of good news earnings, whereas it has no negative effect on in formativeness of bad news earning. Furthermore, until one bankrupt company exists, earnings in formativeness reduction of good news is more than when a number of bankrupt companies exist. Conclusion: The result shows that bankruptcy contagion through inter-industry reduces the earnings informativeness of surviving firms. Based on conservatism and Asymmetric profit sustainability, in these companies earning response coefficient is asymmetric for good news compared to bad news.

The purpose of this study is to examine the relationship between informativeness of earnings as proxy for earning-return relationship and levels of transparency of financial information in Iran. We select 184 firms listed in Tehran Stock Exchange (TSE) for the years 1386 and 1387. Then, the sample firms were divided into firms with low and firms with high financial information transparency. The study uses Multiple Liner Regression Models to test the relationship between financial information transparency and the informativeness of earnings.The results show that there are significant reductions on earnings response coefficient for the firms with higher financial information transparency. The results verify that in more transparent firms the relevant information earnings could be reflected in advance in stock prices. Therefore, earnings informativeness in such firms is lower than the others.

Investors, creditors and financial analysts are interested in gaining more information about income smoothing in investee companies, especially if it would be effective on their deciding. The Finding of many researches shows that investors prefer a smooth profit and low fluctuation. Due to this fact, managers try to show the smoothness of growth rate and profit. This research wants to survey the influence of income smoothing in accepted companies society in securities exchange on information content of earnings. In this research, smoothing has measured during 2001-2005 income by using Eckle index, and the research is surveyed in 4 hypotheses type by companies dividing into two income smoothing and none smoothing. The results show income smoothing result in increasing the information content, and the main goal of smoothing is not information distortion. It should be considered that there is a positive relation between current and future income, and there is a direct and positive relation between future incomes with smoothed income of company. Also, it increases smoothing the information content of earnings with respect of future cash flow and the power of profit in future accruals which should be considered by users while deciding.

Investment institutions with substantial shareholdings in a firm have the resources and incentives to monitor and influence management decisions. Whether the institutions actually monitor and exert pressure on managers is an empirical question. This study is designed to provide insights into the monitoring role of institutional investors by examining whether institutional ownership affects the in formativeness of reported earnings. In this study, different hypothesis (active Monitoring Hypothesis & private benefits Hypothesis) in relation to institutional investors, are tested. Two multifold linear regressions analysis is used to test the relation between corporate Earnings in formativeness and institutional ownership. The results demonstrate significant evidence of a positive association between percent of institutional stock ownership and Earnings in formativeness and approve Effective Monitoring Hypothesis. In addition, the number of institutional ownership dose not improves Earnings in formativeness and decreases it.

The present study is to analyze the impact of bad news on quarterly earnings in formativeness of Tehran listed companies during a quarter. The value of earnings reporting process, which is considered an information source for investors, highly depends on the delay in the release of the bad news. This process, be it either due to creating incentives for early and voluntary disclosure or as a result of mandatory disclosure, leads to more precise and prompt release of bad news. It seems managers are more inclined to voluntary disclosure when there is good news or there is no information asymmetry rather than when there is bad news about the company. The main question of this research is whether or not there is a meaningful relation between presence of bad news during a quarter and quarterly earnings in formativeness. In pursuance of answering this question, the data of 80 Tehran listed companies from 2008 to 2012, whose entire information can be found on CODAL, were analyzed using fixed effects regression. The result shows that there is meaningful positive relation between the presence of bad news during a quarter and quarterly earnings in formativeness.

The Effect of CEO Power on Quarterly Earnings Announcement Informativeness Abstract The aim of this study is to investigate the effect of CEO Power on Quarterly Earnings Announcement Informativeness of listed Companies in Tehran Stock Exchange. For this purpose one hypotheses are developed and data on the 108 companies in Tehran Stock Exchange for the period of 1389 to 1396 were analyzed. This regression model using panel data with fixed effects approach and tests. The results showed that the concentration CEO Power has significant positive impact on Quarterly Earnings Announcement Informativeness. Therefore, the research results indicate that the Powerful executives have more independence and you have more supervisory roles on the board this reduces the disadvantages of stakeholder rights and reduce the agency costs, and thus reduce agency costs reduce information asymmetry and reduce the opacity in financial and thus Increase Quarterly Earnings Announcement Informativeness.